ARISTOTLE ON NATURAL LAW

Max Salomon Shellens
WHEN DISCUSSING LAW AND JUSTICE philosophers and historians almost invariably claim that Aristotle' is the father of natural law. The truth of this claim will not be contested here. However, without a clear understanding of what Aristotle meant by the expression "natural law," the claim that he was the father of natural law has little significance.
1. Aristotle did not coin the term 81Kauov cvo0-K'V, nor was he the first person to relate 'justice' to 'nature.' It is important to stress this in order to appreciate fully the way he approaches the problem of natural law in its various aspects. Largely through the teachings of the Sophists the expression SKatov 4vov had become quite popular by the time of Aristotle.
2 Despite considerable doctrinal differences in various dicta of the Sophists concerning the 8tKatov cVCtKoV they all share a polemical character. Aristotle's treatment of this subject is polemical too; but what distinguishes him from his predecessors is the fact that he endeavors to overcome a purely negative attitude, thereby turning a slogan into a serious problem. In sum, by clarifying the idea of justice as a whole, he seeks a constructive approach to the problem of 8,Katov04,TKoV.
The far-reaching significance of his achievement has not yet been fully appreciated. Hence a new and unbiased inquiry seems to be desirable. 3 Only a classical philologist could determine the manner in which the various Aristotelian writings on natural law are related to one another; and only he could determine the chronological order of these writings. Solutions to these philological questions would be of considerable importance. They would determine whether there was, in Aristotle's thought, a development toward a deeper conception of the problem of natural law, corresponding to the development of his insights in the realms of sociology and history.
Aristotle's authorship of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric cannot reasonably be challenged. However, the same cannot be said of the Magna Moralia. It has been argued by some that this work was composed by a disciple either of Aristotle or possibly of Theophrastus. Others regard Aristotle himself as the true author. These are moot questions
4 not yet answered to everyone's satisfaction; but whatever the ultimate answer may be, the Magna Moralia exhibits the thought of Aristotle and his school. Hence it is of utmost importance to examine thoroughly the treatment in the Magna Moralia of the idea of justice and of the question of natural law. On certain points there is a close affinity between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna Moralia. For instance, one finds the problem of changeability and the reference to right-handed and ambidextrous people in both works. But the basic meaning of the term "natural law" as used in the Magna Moralia differs fundamentally from that in the Nicomachean Ethics. The doubtful authorship of the Magna Moralia may be the reason why discussions of Aristotle's views on natural law center upon the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric. This is a great mistake. Whether we can attribute the Magna Moralia to Aristotle himself is, from a systematic point of view, of little importance. For did not Socrates inform Charmides that it is not as important to determine who said certain words as it is to determine whether they are true or not? 5 Ignoring for the time being the purely philological problems of authenticity, it is our aim to use the statements about natural law in the four texts mentioned as a means to a better understanding of the complex problem of natural law in particular and of justice in general. (The Eudemian Ethics, it will be noted, does not make an independent contribution to the discussion. The passages on justice found there are the same as those contained in the Nicomachean Ethics.)
Having thus established the limits of our subject, we now begin the discussion of it.
2. As for the terminology in general, it cannot be denied that the term &KatoI ObVo-LK'JV is more satisfactory than the more equivocal expression 'natural law. ' We make a clear statement when we say: "of justice part is natural, part is legal." 6 Such a statement cannot easily be misunderstood; it declares that the second part, namely, legal justice, is man-made justice. Conversely, it makes natural justice an eternally open question, unsolved and maybe unsolvable. Because of the close affinity of 'legal' and 'law,' the term 'natural law' is more likely to be confounded with man-made law than the term 'natural justice.' Also, at times it might be safer to approach the whole problem of natural law in terms of whether a certain conduct accords with natural justice. However, since the term 'natural law' is commonly used, we shall follow the established tradition and speak, though with some hesitation, about natural law and legal law.
Similar difficulties are inherent in the Greek term vo'lpog. To translate it simply as 'law' leads to considerable misunderstanding. We would have to stretch the meaning of 'law' unduly in order to arrive at the correct meaning of the Greek term. The term v61og refers not only to what we commonly call 'law,' but also to the principles of customs, morals, manners and habits -to everything which is a principle of order within, social life. Thus we read in the Rhetoric 7 that courage, as well as temperance and justice, is based on the v4pos, and that they are in accord with the dictates of the v61o . 8 The votloT, so to speak, is at work wherever people submit to, and feel bound by, propositions deciding the worthiness or unworthiness of a certain behavior within a given community. Although the English language, too, uses the term 'law' in a fairly broad sense, encompassing the rules of nature as well as the rules of games, it is still too restricted a concept to express the fullness of the Greek v'/og. 'Norm,' on the other hand, is probably a more satisfactory translation.
Whether such a norm is written or not is unimportant. The decisive characteristic of a norm is that it is fixed (in some way) and enacted. Aristotle repeatedly refers to the 'lawgiver,' the vo/LOOET7q. But when using this expression he does not have in mind the actual 'writer' or the author of a specific norm. The voPzo6T-g is not a mythical entity either: he is quite simply that authority which in the accepted sense has the power to lay down a norm.
This being so, our subsequent remarks will focus on the terms justice, natural law, legal law, and norm. 1. According to traditional opinion, Aristotle's 'true' meaning of natural law has been laid down in unequivocal terms in the Rhetoric. Since it is never advisable completely to ignore traditional views, let us consider whether we have to read only the Rhetoric in order to understand Aristotle's conception of natural law. The Rhetoric, to be sure, contains important references to natural law, although the term itself is rarely used. It is here that we are told that the law is either particular or general:
9 particular law is that law which is applied by a particular state in administering justice; general law is that law which, being acknowledged and recognized by everybody, is not confined to a particular state. The latter is logically unwritten law. This dualism is later examined 10 through the following two questions: What is the special character of each of the two kinds of law? What does each of them signify? We are told by way of a restatement of the previous definition that particular law is restricted to the people who enacted it. General law is defined as that law which is Kara o'ov or 'according to nature.' I' In this manner the term KaTa ovbirtv is introduced into the discussion of natural law. Once again we are confronted with the problem of written vs. unwritten in connection with all laws, whether particular or general. While it is taken for granted that a general law can only be unwritten, a particular law is described as being either written or unwritten. 12 In order to understand the teachings of the Rhetoric great pains should be taken not to confuse general with particular unwritten laws. In the context of Aristotle's discussion in the Rhetoric the term 'unwritten law' is used in at least four distinct ways: (a) In human life as well as in theory there is always the possibility of excess. It is here that we have to seek the distinction between virtue and vice. 13 How does the written law operate in such cases? The answer can only be that it is silent; it does not envisage such a problem. Since we cannot help trying to find a solution to the problems involved, we turn to unwritten laws. But how do we explain that the written law, any written law, is not capable of coping with these difficulties? The answer can only be that the actions in question are not within the purview of written law. In this connection the term 'law' has a dual meaning: a wider one expressed by the term of 'unwritten law,' and a more restricted one referred to by the term 'written law.' If this were not so, the unwritten law would not be capable of facing a problem at the point where the written law must fail by its own standards or limitations as a law. Evidently the meaning is (1) that the action in question lies beyond the reaches of justice proper; (2) that the unwritten law is a norm (as explained above) but not a law; and (3) that it aims at moral, ethical, and possibly religious values or whatever takes their place, but not at justice in the usual and more specific meaning of the term. In order to understand these thoughts we may refer to the explicit distinction, found in the Nicomachean Ethics, 1 4 between justice in a wider and in a narrower sense. Justice in its comprehensive meaning knows only one norm: to act and to behave like an honest and decent man -"honeste vivere." This norm, whatever its content, cannot, of course, be written law.
The difference between written and unwritten laws is to be found not in the way laws approach the reality they are supposed to control, but in the system of values (of which justice is a member) which is applied to this reality. Individual problems of evaluation themselves express the conditions for applying the system or systems of values used in evaluation. As far as justice itself is concerned this kind of unwritten law does not refer to justice at all, unless -as is always possible -this term is stretched beyond its limits.
(b) In another connection 15 we learn, by way of an apparent anomaly, that there is a kind of particular law that is supposed to be unwritten law. Particular law, Aristotle restates here, 16 is a special agreement made by the community and concerning that community; hence it is binding only upon that particular community. But where a definite agreement exists, the law, too, must be definite (or written). An unwritten (indefinite) law which has expressly (definitely) been agreed upon is a contradiction in itself. Thus a law is necessarily a written law if its source is a definite agreement. Aristotle, however, gives neither examples nor further explanations of particular unwritten laws. It is quite possible, therefore, that here he may have equity in mind. Only the rule of equity is at the same time particular and general. Unwritten laws in the form of particular laws would then play the same role as general laws do in the entire realm of justice. At this point it is advisable to discuss Aristotle's concept of equity.
(c) Whenever Aristotle discusses equity at greater length he posits a direct relation between equity and the unwritten law: written and unwritten laws are no longer contrasted but are placed parallel to one another. The "norms" or "rules" of equity are not of the kind that could be written down. That is their very essence. Here once more we encounter a form of "unwritten law." But this kind of "unwritten law" is not natural law. Nor does it help to solve the real problem of natural law.
(d) Previously we have used the expressions "particular law" and "general law." In the Rhetoric, 22 where the unwritten law is identified with natural law, these two terms are dealt with in more detail. Natural law exists without an agreement, and it does not require any form of association. The "general law," we are told, contains more justice and gives more truth and expediency and accomplishes the work of the law better than its counterpart, the written (or "particular") law.
2 3 Being general, it does not undergo any changes, 2 4 while the written law frequently varies. 2 5 These are also the arguments, according to Aristotle, by which Antigone justifies her disregard of Creon's order. Sophocles calls the law she follows 'eternal.' In this context the terms "eternal" and "unchangeable" evidently mean something not limited by territorial boundaries, not changing from country to country. It is not immediately evident why the unwritten law should serve justice better simply because it is not subject to change. On this point, however, the Rhetoric offers no further explanations. We shall see later that the problem of changeability plays an important role in the discussions of natural law in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Magna Moralia. Not being enforceable by sanctions, the unwritten law is definitely at a disadvantage. 26 The question of compulsion, on the other hand, is closely related to the questions of certainty and dependability. Thus for the 'higher' form of justice there is no evidence in the form of a proof. The analogy with equity is not convincing. The idea of an eternal, never changing law stirs our imagination and appeals to our emotional feeling. This is not true, however, of the written law -the rigidly strict norm, unmerciful in particular circumstances. The method of the Rhetoric is, of course, bound to be scientific. Its conclusions obviously are not supposed to be aporiae or "fictions." Its subject, however, is not science or ethics or anything of the kind. Neither the truth of scientific statements nor the moral value of clearly defined actions is scientifically explored here. For there is one thing that the Rhetoric definitely does not do: it does not weigh values. Its aim is to demonstrate something quite different, namely, the most efficient manner of 'persuasion' 27 in the interest of certain ends which are taken for granted and are not examined in themselves. In themselves these ends are not necessarily related to scientific truth or to moral values. No one knows better than Aristotle the difference, for instance, between statesmanship and rhetoric. Merely to call attention to values and value judgments without discussing or judging their merits is, for Aristotle, pure sophistry.
There are, Aristotle insists, five 'nontechnical' means of persuasion characteristic of forensic oratory (where undoubtedly we have to deal with the idea of justice). One of these is the laws, and others are witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths. Since we are actually confronted with a dual "set" of laws, namely, fixed laws and unfixed laws, a forensic orator is faced with the alternative of invoking either the one or the other. But he cannot appeal to both at the same time.
It might be helpful to translate the relevant paragraphs from the Rhetoric into the language of our time.
"Students of the law or lawyers-to-be, if you wish to win your case in the law courts, remind 'the jury' that it is their sacred duty to do justice -justice and nothing else; that while giving their verdict in this particular case they are serving the most sacred idea the world has ever known. When they are thus truly impressed and are convinced that by their vote they decide the fate of justice, then you may concentrate on your special case (up to this point you cannot go wrong by using identical words and sentences). If the law is in your favor, you must then argue that this sacred justice rests on nothing else but the law which is open to everyone's inspection and verification, as well as on the respect towards the wisdom and greatness of the rules 27. Rh. 1355 b 27.
that have been transmitted to us by our forefathers or promulgated by a wise and impartial government. How can anyone be permitted to trifle with such institutions! 28 However, should the law be against your client's case, then plead exactly the other way round, 29 but still display the same air of conviction: stress the insufficiency and the logical limitations of statements contained in rigid generalities, and their inability to cope adequately with the unforseeable complexity of the concrete problem at issue. Whatever your case may be, this leads you immediately to claim that the jurors cannot but decide in your favor, adhering alternatively to the fixed law or to the natural law. And always, of course, to the yvd4l 7 dplo'T71. 30 In both instances you appear clearly to act as the devoted and humble servant of justice whose plea is motivated solely by his love of justice and nothing else. But in both instances your arguments make justice a servant of your particular interests. This is the best way to win your case."
We may also transfer this advice from law to politics, from how to win a legal argument to how to win an election. If the candidate belongs to the party in power, one would argue that the existing tradition has stood the test, that there is an inherent danger in new experiments, and that there is a duty to repay faith by faith. From the other side we would hear about the danger of permitting a situation to stagnate, and about the desirability of electing new people with new ideas. The campaign motto would be: "It is time for a change." Such slogans are known to everyone. This raises the question: Are the speech writers concerned with truth or are they merely interested in effective campaign oratory? To what extent is the sociologist who describes effective oratory concerned with the rightness or wrongness of such oratory?
These examples are designed to illustrate, by the use of modern terms, the teachings of the Rhetoric. Aristotle, to be sure, was not discussing the morality of such arguments. He merely revealed the weakness of human emotions and, what is even more relevant, how this weakness can be exploited. Undoubtedly, people want to win lawsuits or electoral contests. It is no secret that certain procedures help and others do harm. If we intend to study the reactions to rhetorical methods, we should be candid.
Aristotle knew that some persons held certain views about natural law, and that others held diametrically opposed views. The Rhetoric, however, does not prove or even discuss the validity of either of the opposed positions. The allusions to natural law in the Rhetoriq neither estimate its moral value nor establish the relationship of "legal" law to natural law. Hence these allu- sions cannot possibly contain Aristotle's 'real' views on natural law. The aim of the Rhetoric, in regard to natural law, is to show that the term natural law is in vogue and that from a certain point of view it is considered an advantage to make use of its emotional appeal.
To sum up: In the Rhetoric Aristotle intends neither to assert nor to prove that the natural law holds any kind of superior position. No judgment is passed on natural law. He merely introduces us to a catchword without discussing its moral significance. Hence what he says here is neither an exaltation nor a depreciation of natural law. III 1. "Insofar as law is not 'by nature' but is merely human enactment it is not the same everywhere. It is not even the case with regard to constitutions that they are everywhere the same, though there is only one constitution which is -by nature -everywhere the best." 31 This is the last sentence of the chapter on natural law contained in the Nichomachean Ethics. Here natural law plays the role of deciding questions of justice and, in so doing, it also judges the law that is actually in force. Now we can readily understand why Aristotle's authority is traditionally called upon to defend, and to glorify, the idea of natural law. The sentence quoted above contains the term -q &pirai (the best) .32 Aristotle does not use such predicates as 'useful' or 'recommendable' or 'most serviceable'; neither does he call "the best constitution" 'right' or 'correct.' The term 47 dpto-r7 assigns the statement to the realm of ethics or ethical judgments. The most important parts of the Politics, like those of the Nicomachean Ethics, are based on ethical valuations. The term 7 dpto'r has the same ethical meaning in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics as it has in the Eudemian Ethics, a fact which closely relates these works. 3 3 The teachings of the Politics -and the same applies to the Nicomachean Ethics -do not aim at mere descriptions, except where we are presented with a collection of facts which are necessary to demonstrate how at different times certain problems have been dealt with. Politics and ethics are sciences, or to be more exact, axiomatic sciences defining, by the use of a scientific method of judg Hence in contrast to the laws of (physical) nature, legal laws may be valid but not in force, or in force but not valid (validity being a characteristic quality of natural law).
The distinction between "being in force" and "being valid" is one between two different spheres of spiritual being. The key to this problem can be found in the use of the term Ocr &, in the Nicomachean Ethics. When we call a constitution "the best" -that is, when we declare it valid whether in force or not -we must realize that "being in force" and "being valid" have nothing to do with each other. A single law may have both of these properties or it may have one and lack the other; but this does not affect the properties themselves. 'Nature' belongs to another plane. What is valid by nature may actually be in force; but this "being in force" might be merely accidental.
When we select a single constitution and assert that it is the best of all constitutions, past and present, real or imaginary, then the other constitutions are not only not the best: they are bad, inferior, poor or whatever other value we wish to assign to them. It may be possible to show higher or lower degrees of adequacy. We see in the Politics that a bad form of government is always considered a perversion of the good form of government and, accordingly, opposed by the latter.
3 5 According to the more elaborate and evidently later teachings of the Nicomachean Ethics, it should not be difficult to indicate at least two contrasting "forms" opposed to the good "form" and, also, opposed to each other as "too much" 36 and "too little." 37 The good "form,"
it may be maintained, is the mean between two evils, or perhaps better, between two imperfect forms. We know that the problems of politics arise out of the problems of ethics. The judgment we pass on constitutions is "science" in the same way as moral teaching is science. But whereas it is not difficult to show, e.g., that liberality 3 8 is the mean between prodigality and meanness, and pride 3 9 the mean between vanity and humility, the definition of the "best government" offers some difficulty. The proof of what is the best government sometimes relies on the magic word "nature," or, as in the Politics, employs as a criterion the "common good," 40 without, however, linking this "common good" to "nature." discussed the problem of the changeability of the natural law. It is also possible that the reference to this illustration was carried over into the On'o-tqnotion of the Nicomachean Ethics without being adapted to the profounder meaning it acquired there. In any case, all these discussions fail to shed any light on the real meaning of natural law in the Nicomachean Ethics.
We have already seen that the &,KaoV VO!UKOV cannot be proved in the same way as the &tKaLov Obvo-uK4v can be proved. On the other hand, an enacted law could very well have been one way or another, something which is not true of a constitution. In addition, it is not true that all enacted laws, no matter what their subject may be, can be adjusted and improved to such a degree that they become natural laws. The enacted law is characterized by its original indifference towards its content -oro0) 3 AXXcoq, whereas natural law from the beginnning aims at being 'the best.' 2. The difference between &iKatov ovoKOV and &LKatov V0o.LKOv does not arise because of human limitations; hence it cannot be overcome by greater efforts to grasp the truth. There are always good and bad constitutions; but they are good or bad "according to nature." The difference between a good and a bad constitution is not so great as that between laws which can be good or bad by nature and those which cannot be evaluated according to nature. This appears to be the central problem of Aristotle's theory in the Nicomachean Ethics: the difference between enacted law and natural law does not lie in the fact that the former gives the right and the latter gives the wrong solution to the same legal problem. This is the usual but erroneous interpretation of the difference between enacted and natural law. However, this difference is related to structural differences between the problems appropriate to each. A law which has the character of a natural law is different from the "mere human" law, not because the latter may be wrong "according to nature," but because the "human" law deals with a problem concerning which 54. See infra, IV.
it makes no sense to ask for a solution based on nature. If a legal problem does not belong to the sphere of natural law, no conceivable effort can invest the solution with validity "according to nature." Thus the difference between two sets, not of answers, but of potential laws is the difference of the highest importance, although it has not yet been taken into full account.
Once the easily misleading argument from changeability has been removed, it remains to point out that natural law and human law differ in respect to the Sivajzug. 55 We may presume that by claiming the same &Uval t everywhere for natural law, the word is being used metaphorically 5 9 in a more pregnant sense than it could have in connection with, e.g., geometry. It indicates a norm 60 immanent in things themselves, a norm which is not dependent upon human discretion. Natural law has everywhere the same SUvap.w; the mere human law could with equal propriety be different. Therefore, natural law is not capable of being different than it is; mere human law does not have everywhere the same 86a/zL.
Things are either capable or not capable of being different than they are; tertium non datur. This idea is found in all the teachings of Aristotle. This may be the reason why no special explanation of it is given in the chapter on natural law, where, as we see, it plays a decisive role. However, the idea is dealt with in a later chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics. And so the doctrine of natural law is a science; its methods are the methods of a science. The doctrine of the other kind of justice has neither the dignity nor the rigor of a science; and its methods must be nonscientific.
This description of the doctrine of nonnatural law is negative. We have, however, other descriptions which are definitely positive. Only things that are capable of being other than they are permit reflection, deliberation, and decision.
68 Only in this area may questions be settled arbitrarily. Accordingly, we can only recognize, but not decide upon, laws in force at a previous time or at present. In this respect we are faced by facts which we ourselves cannot change or influence. However, what the provisions of specific nonnatural law should be is not something for mere recognition but, on the other hand, requires reflection, deliberation, and decision.
3. The examples of mere human law in the Nicomachean Ethics (amount of the ransom, rites of sacrifices) are not representative of all nonnatural law. Natural law is not involved when rules are given for a singular and isolated case or when a plebiscite is involved. 73 The word "plebiscite" does not convey Aristotle's meaning precisely: qnbOt"ara are norms put into force on the spur of the moment, without due deliberation and without a full examination of their universal application. It is evident that such human laws are different from the previous ones. The lesson is clear. Natural law is not a law outside or beyond justice. Before a norm can be considered either a natural or a human law it must satisfy the conditions of justice as a whole.
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Human justice is not a disfiguration of justice waiting to be corrected and improved by natural law. Human justice is justice -only not of the same kind as natural law. And so there are certain conditions that must be fulfilled if a norm, be it natural or human, is to be a norm of justice, of justice proper and not of other ideas no matter how exalted. One essential characteristic of justice as a whole is its universality. From all this it would follow that natural law is not present (a) where the answer to a problem depends upon our free moral decision and, hence, cannot be supplied by scientific proof; and (b) where no rule of a general character is involved.
Similarly, where there is no general rule there is no justice. We are approaching what can be called a general theory of justice or jurisprudence. Its role is to determine what the conditions and presuppositions are for a norm to be a norm of justice in the strict sense. When we set out to answer this question we are aware that it is not offered for our personal deliberations. We cannot decide at will if the limits of justice should be so or otherwise; what we have to do is to recognize them. We are in this respect exploring the "a priori" of justice.
Even though the problems relating to the "a priori" of justice are of a scientific character and would seem, therefore, to be confined to the area of 74 78. E.N. 1134 b 23. 79. Pol. 1292 a 20. "natural law" is too often stretched in its application to the theory of the "a priori" of justice. Whether or not this is done, the fact remains that the subject of these problems is in any case completely different. In the language of Aristotle, the "a priori" of justice is called &tKatov a1rXcj.
8 0 The natural law does not pass judgment on the human law, for only something above both kinds of justice can do this. The doctrine of the "a priori" of justice seeks to bring the foundations of justice to light, to show the premises of what is just. It neither tries nor is able to provide concrete answers to practical questions. It does not produce the 'best' solution to a specific legal problem, e.g., that of the best constitution. This is, so to speak, the curse of the theory; it appears 'useless' from a practical point of view, and it will always be neglected for just this reason. Exactly the same applies, however, to the theory of natural law as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle does not teach us how to prove that a law is a natural law, e.g., how to deduce the 'best' government from the higher principle and so to demonstrate that it is really the best. He follows the approach he uses to best advantage in all his teachings of ethics. He attempts to arouse in us a feeling for values and their quality, taking as a standard the honest and esteemed citizen of his age.
Accordingly, when he refers to natural law in his various writings he goes beyond mere formal declarations. He prefers here, as always, to show his methods in actual operation. An example of this is his observation that there are slaves by nature and slaves by mere norms. the conclusions which may be deduced from propositions established by natural law as "the best." It is obvious that by accepting a certain constitution as the best, the aspects of justice and the corresponding laws inherent in such a constitution are, to a high degree, fixed by mere logic. 8 9 But apart from this, whatever our human shortcomings in grasping and recognizing the truth, the fact still remains that there are two kinds of justice. It is a scientific truth that a line of division may be drawn between a law that can be proved and a law that cannot be proved but which bases its validity on nothing but an act of promulgation. There will, of course, always be doubts as to whether a proposition declared to be a natural law will stand the test. We come, e.g., across the dogma that a certain kind of war is qVa-eft &Kcov.90 This 'deduction' may be correct. It depends upon another proposition of natural law to the effect that there are people created to render services similar to those of animals. These people are, therefore, meant to be slaves, and if they do not realize the 'truth' of this verdict and do not accept it, then they have to be shown their actual position by way of war. One is tempted to recall a remark of Heine, that it all depends on the proof of the statement that some men are born with saddles on their back, some with spurs on their feet.
4. There remains the question: What governs the laws which may be oTrwo 7 ' Mo0g? Regardless of their content, once they are promulgated, they are in force. The alternative solutions which might have been promulgated are of possible historical value but otherwise insignificant. So what is the justification for the provision actually chosen and promulgated?
One possible answer is that after a specific norm has become law it is 'proved' to be "the best" according to Aristotle's meaning, i.e., the best from a moral point of view according to a scientific proof. This would mean that originally the dictum of the law was not capable of being other than as it is and, hence, the law would not be of the kind we are presently considering. Such a 'proof,' accordingly, cannot be accepted.
In the chapter on natural law in the Nicomachean Ethics there is a hint of an answer to our question. We are told that we make use of large weights in buying wholesale quantities and smaller weights in the retail business; this evidently is the meaning of the passage involved, written in connection with the problem of changeability. tion. 92 This reference to convention is not new; that norm-laws are characterized by this notion was mentioned before. Now, however, the rules of changing weights are related to the idea of usefulness 93 as well. The link drawn at this point between norm-law and usefulness does not explain much, just as the reference to the common-best 94 gives no help. It may be difficult to see in this remark the germ of a theory on how laws should be enacted when they do not belong to the sphere of natural laws. Usefulness and "the best" always remain in different worlds. Natural law may mean the right solution of a problem wrongly solved by existing norms; in this case the right and the wrong solutions of an identical problem confront each other. In this case the existence of two different solutions to the same problem indicate the existence of a wrong and a right (or less wrong) natural law solution. There is always an antithesis between solutions based on scientific proof and solutions based on some other principle, possibly the principle of usefulness.
As we have seen, Aristotle is dealing with questions of jurisprudence. We should not blame him if a critique of lawgiving is not included in his essay. The whole Book E of the Nicomachean Ethics is designed as a discussion of justice as a virtue, in the same way that courage, temperance, or friendliness, for example, is a virtue. It is only by way of an appendix that attention is transferred from the subjective factors of human behavior to the objective conditions of justice, as incorporated in laws valid for a human community.
5. If we can accept Aristotle's insight into the difference between laws which can be proved (because they concern that which is not capable of being other than it is) and laws which are merely in force (because their content is capable of being other than it is) as being a lasting achievement of our scientific knowledge, then we cannot avoid the question as to whether there is a like distinction in other spheres of human relationship such as friendship, love, worship, comradeship, and partnership. According to Aristotle cftta 9 5 and justice refer to the same persons and to the same objects. valid scientifically and things for which deviations from rules are to be expected. Aristotle himself limits his ideas about natural law to justice. The difficulties, of course, would be exactly the same as we encountered before. The scientific proof is dependent on the methods of ethics. These methods are not easy to describe and are even less easy to apply. There will always be people lacking what Nietzsche calls intellectual honesty 9 7 who will "prove" the norms which, for reasons of their own, they wish to have enforced. In so doing they ignore the fact that since these norms could easily be quite different, their "proofs" are a matter of discretionary decision rather than conclusive evidence.
Finally, there is one highly important question which Aristotle does not consider, the question of convictions and moral judgments transmitted from generation to generation, varying from country to country and adapted to the special aspects of the epoch. When working on a problem of (real) natural law we may always start ab ovo. In order to find the 'best' answer, we may not -or should not -be influenced by the contemporary solutions given to the problem involved. On the other hand, if we are to find a just solution to a problem in the realm of things which can be other than they are, we should not set aside contemporary solutions. Here, what is called 'common law' guides the application and evolution of justice.
This hint may suffice. Our aim is neither to decide upon the merits of natural law itself nor upon its limits, but only to discover the ideas which are explicit or implicit in Aristotle's teachings on this topic. IV 1. We turn now to the Magna Moralia. Here again we find, in the chapters dealing with the problem of justice, the term 4oCEt &iKatov. Here the meaning of this term differs completely from that in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics. It is neither a slogan of propaganda nor an appeal to science and scientific proof. Rather, it acquaints us with another problem, a problem presented to us unavoidably by the idea of justice, or, more exactly, by our way of practicing justice.
It might be advisable to give a translation of the key passage. 98 The sentences, as Aristotle wrote them, are often no more than mere catch phrases and must be supplemented (as shown in the brackets) in order to be fully understood. On the other hand, what we lay down and promulgate as statutes is [no doubt] justice; but it is this only in consequence of our doing so, and we call it justice by statute, but what we are looking for [in our present treatise] is justice in the sense of public law, and this public law is based on statutes and not on nature. [Therefore, we do not include natural law in our discussions.]
In one respect this description coincides with the main thesis of the Nicomachean Ethics: natural law and legal law represent two different kinds of law, separated by an unbridgeable gap. Legal law is based on promulgation. According to the Nicomachean Ethics, there is a chance that natural law will be accepted as legal law and will accordingly be promulgated. Here in the Magna Moralia a promulgated natural law is itself a contradiction. This is a first indication that natural law in the Magna Moralia does not deal with the same problem we encountered in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric.
In the Magna Moralia natural law is recognized as justice (of a certain kind) and is characterized as being in actual use, despite its incompatibility with promulgation. It is in use not here and there and from time to time, but for a certain duration of time and as an accepted rule.
At the start of the discussion we are told that the distinction between legal law and natural law is not to be found in a difference with regard to the possibility of change. We saw in the Nicomachean Ethics that the question of changeability played a large part in the debates in which Aristotle participated. Whenever justice and sbiros were brought into a positive connection, one was always told that cno-V, may be a cause of movement, but cannot be moved and changed itself. It is exempt from alteration. However, what is called justice based on 0/nortq is, like any other kind of law, given to changes, as is evident. Therefore, the expression o'ot 8Katov cannot embody the meaning of the term 0n'o-tT; and so it is misleading to maintain that there is something like a natural law. The battle against the importance of natural law might well have been conducted in this way.
This may be the reason why, even before any serious demonstration takes place, great pains are taken in the Magna Moralia to straighten out this difficulty. This is done in a straightforward way: 4no-g, we are told, has not the meaning of being unmoveable, at least not here in the discussion of justice and law. "What prevails generally, that is, what is based on nature" (generally, and so by nature) 9 9 is "what is valid in most cases and for the greatest length of time." 100 Such a change in the meaning of 'being by nature' gives us a completely different outlook and brings us face to face with new problems. These new problems are rendered even more difficult by the quite surprising remark at the end of the text, as quoted above, that natural law cannot and will not be dealt with in the Magna Moralia. 10 1 It is decisively excluded as a potential topic. Accordingly, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Magna Moralia. We must be satisfied with the few remarks we have seen. But we cannot leave it at this time since the problem of natural law has been raised under such different circumstances, and also because of the declaration that natural law is 'superior' to legal law. 10 2 2. Why this exclusion of natural law from the discussion in the Magna Moralia? Not for any reason connected with its being 'natural.' Rather, the reason is that it is not deemed to be justice at all in the meaning this term has in the Magna Moralia. We saw this before while discussing the Nicomachean Ethics. Unless a norm belongs to the sphere of justice, it cannot be a natural law. The problem of natural law lies outside the kind of specific law that is discussed in the Magna Moralia; and as the inquiry, we are told, is not to be extended to any outside norm, it has no place in the Magna Moralia.
At this point there is a decisive discrepancy between the Magna Moralia and the Nicomachean Ethics. Both books agree in that they contrast natural law and legal law. On the one hand the term characterizes a certain kind of behavior described as the acme of virtue.
1 0 7 The Nicomachean Ethics" 0 8 goes one step further in this respect by adding the view that although it is the totality of virtue, it is such a totality only insofar as "directed towards fellowmen." It is therefore something more, or even other than, the sum of all the individual virtues. However, the Magna Moralia speaks only about a relationship KaO" eavr6v,, 1°9 as it is specific for virtue as a whole. In this way justice is confined to an amalgam of facts previously discovered in the analysis of the various virtues. This difference, however, does not matter here. The main point is that justice in this first sense is a definite attitude in our life, and this attitude is measured by conformity with, or deviation from, the V05/o., 0i° To act in conformity with the law is to act justly;"' to act contrary to it is to act unjustly. Considering the far-reaching meaning of v,40t, already mentioned above, it should not be overlooked that there is no direct connection between this kind of justice and either the ethical good called justice or legal law, judges, lawcourts and the like. Thus, in discussing natural law, consideration of a special kind of human character is of no assistance. Natural law cannot be explained as originating in human E . tity or of quality, 1 15 but it is in any case something that can be measured in a strictly mathematical sense. In this respect justice means something quite different from justice as the mark of a particular person, state of mind, or virtue. Justice in this respect is a principle, a rule, or a moral value.
It should not seem strange that, as explained in the Magna Moralia, and in more detail in the Nicomachean Ethics, the term 'justice' has a double meaning, especially if we consider that in everyday English usage it has the same double meaning. English 'justice' may mean a virtue as well as "the just" and lawful. In this respect the German language is substantially the same, since the term 'Gerechtigkeit'. can be applied both to a characteristic of any individual who is gerecht and to anything denoted by the noun "Recht. ' The Nicomachean Ethics 1 16 contains the important assertion that all that is lawful (justice in the first sense) is just (justice in the second sense), while not all that is just is lawful. Such an assertion is missing in the Magna Moralia, yet it would not have been incompatible with the teaching of the Magna Moralia. It is a very helpful sentence and proves that the dividing line between the two kinds of justice is correctly drawn. To act in accordance with what the norm prescribes indicates that one has a just character; a just character, however, concerns many things other than mere conformity with specific laws. As mentioned before, the norm that directs the behavior of a man deserving the name 'just' extends beyond the limits of any law (be it by statute or by nature). Hence we conclude that the two meanings are actually identical." 7 It is only by trying to find the meaning of 'justice' that we can hope to cope with the problem of natural law. The vo'zoq, which is the basis of the virtue of &Katoo v , does not lead us to natural law. The Nicomachean Ethics contains a profound study of this virtue. The question of how it is a mean (p4o-6&"v) is mentioned (but not solved).118 For the most part the Magna Moralia neglects to discuss this meaning of justice and concentrates on justice as equality (to'6rT). In like manner it fails to treat of the ovio-t 8&Katov, simply because the latter is not a part of the justice understood as equality.
The Magna Moralia concerns itself with justice only insofar as it signifies equality. When this point of view is taken, then our subject can only be justice as expressed by public law since equality is the main feature of public law. Evidently the meaning here is that the man is born bad and his bad character cannot be overcome, whereas acquired habits may undergo a change for the better. Here the natural (4os) is contrasted with the habitual (Tp&roq) by associating unchangeability with the former. However, this meaning of On'o-tg cannot explain why parity should be related to it. Parity is clearly not something static like the restraint of the temperate man. Rather, it is the goal of our endeavor. People do not have parity. They want it; they all seek it. So we find no help here. And so we can assume that in this connection the word Ov'o-&v means the same as in the passage about natural law, appearing after the argument that no other justice than iKatov 7roXt7Ko0V manifests equality in its pure sense.' 26 Equality in its meaning of "parity based on nature" is a reality even though people recognize their actual inequality. It signifies an equality that is as a matter of fact practiced. It is not created, but is acknowledged by the lawgiver (or refused by him). One is tempted to treat nature's impulse to develop equality into parity as a moral claim. However, Aristotle does not treat nature in this manner, and for him parity, though not fully realized, is a basic fact of life. 4. Accordingly, we come back to the question: Why is natural law elimi- 32 shows that, even though the word 'justice' might not be proper, the relationship in question cannot be described or interpreted adequately without employing the idea of justice. This is confirmed by the fact that in varying degrees these relationships approach that which should be called justice. The relationship between husband and wife is nearer to it than the other ones.
It is essential to realize that natural law (according to the Magna Moralia) is not common law (in the meaning this term has in England). It is not a right founded upon custom, and it is no Gewohnheitsrecht. Whenever such a common law is recognized as being on equal footing with promulgated law, it derives its validity, as does natural law, from actual practice over a given period of time when everybody concerned believes and trusts it to be legal law (e.g., right of way). Its validity is not based on moral or natural hypotheses. Such a common law does not increase the *circle of civic peers, nor does it create a new kind of justice. The distinction in the Magna Moralia between natural law and legal law parallels the distinction in Roman law 134 between ius civile and ius gentium. Although the two pairs of terms are not identical in meaning, yet the comparison clarifies the distinction in the Magna Moralia. However, the rotrTwov &'Katov excludes non-citizens in the same way as ius civile does. This means that there are certain groups in the population who are in commercial contact and who, therefore, seek protection as a 'natural' consequence of this living together. In both cases it is some kind of lack of legal provisions concerning non-citizens that has given rise to the tendency to create an analogue to the law that excludes non-citizens. The analogue is based upon the actual conduct of the members of the community over a given period of time.
Certain groups of people are not considered as fully participating in the existing legal order. If this is true, then the same is true of certain problems and certain questions that are not yet ready for final legislation. The reason all members of the community are not treated as equals is that, for the time being, no way can be found to extend equality to them in certain isolated areas such as housing, job opportunities, or social activities. Here, too, we see life being regulated by certain rules of behavior, valid for the greater number of cases involved during an extended period of time. These rules are accepted without any effort being made to find out the legal aspects of the situation. Finally, however, the concept of justice is brought to bear on these problems, and previous methods of treating them are, after examination, accepted or rejected.
These considerations lead us to regard the question of equality as the fundamental problem of justice. The way this problem is solved in the totality of the applicable norms reveals the stand we take towards the actual inequality of men. It should be the aim of our rational thinking to extend equality to all men in order to bring about what is 'just.' It is the tragedy 135 of justice to destroy to a certain extent the individuality of its subjects when its only purpose is to serve these subjects. Natural law is the eternal doubt hovering over any solution that is given effect at a given time; but not more than a doubt.
On the other hand, we might ask if the fact that there are certain rules in actual use which are distinct from specific laws proves that these rules ought to be accepted as laws. Is the very existence of natural law (in the meaning of the Magna Moralia) enough to vindicate its transition into legal law? Certainly not. But we may ask if this potentiality of the natural law is the reason why it is called better (/ 3 EXrtov) 136 when compared with the statute law.
One is not persuaded by this argument. It would be hard to understand why in a treatise on ethics the 'better' law should be excluded from any discussion. It is more to the point, however, to consider that a few lines earlier 137 we find the same word ('better'), and it is not used here to make a moral judgment. The right hand, despite the possibility of the equal usefulness of the left hand, remains 6EXTLov, and this "by nature" (q'o-ve). The meaning can only be that the right hand is, as a rule, and not only for a limited time of our experience, more apt, more serviceable, more fit to do what we are aiming at when using our hands. Suppose, as is highly probable, f3&Ttov has the same meaning in both places. Then the meaning would be that natural law serves better the task of justice as a whole; it is capable of answering questions that are unavoidable in our social life, but are beyond the capacity of justice if we adhere only to our public laws. In a primitive society, natural law would cover our needs; in an advanced state of civilization legal law is inadequate as soon as it makes limiting suppositions.
The term 'equity' appears in the Magna Moralia. 138 This idea of equity, however, is not related to the problem of natural law as it is there understood. law we encounter in daily life. Both the Magna Moralia and the Nicomachean Ethics go deeper than this. They reveal a very serious problem hidden behind a slogan. It might have been a temptation to build a theory starting from one of the meanings 1 40 of the term 0Vio-it; but both works face the facts presented by the experiences of our daily life and try. to analyze them. They differ fundamentally in the way they do this. The Magna Moralia recognizes natural law as a permanent assault on a law which is in danger of becoming satisfied with the status quo. However, the Magna Moralia does not attempt to establish a dogma capable of leading to a concise doctrine of justice. Rather, it seeks to stimulate the confirmation of answers that might be given to vital questions.
The Nicomachean Ethics cuts through the uncertainty innate in the term. It surpasses the Magna Moralia in relating the isolated problem to the roots of philosophical thought. We are asked to rely on nothing but scientific proof when accepting a proposition as based on natural law. Otherwise we are to take the problem out of the purview of natural law. It is no small accomplishment to grasp the importance of the fact that we argue a great deal about things that may be oi ro 1 a'XX&.
We often do not realize that the 'right' answer to some questions cannot be proved in the way a thesis of science or morals can be proved.
When we see the problems in this perspective, we become aware that the "a priori" of justice is "prior" to the problem of natural law. The "a priori" of justice deals with the conditions that must be met by rules -whether or not they appear as laws or whether they appear as natural or legal laws -if they are to be called rules of justice. The problem of natural law is extremely complex. Aristotle's teachings provide us with significant answers; they leave us also with a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem.
